By so often measuring peacekeeping missions in terms of troop strength rather than their operational and tactical capability to protect civilians, peacekeeping studies have left a void in understanding the emerging challenges facing third generation peace operations. Furthermore, these studies may lead the United Nations to deploy peacekeeping missions which lack tactical and operational capabilities, even though the mission's troop strength appears adequate based on parametric studies. Likewise, receiving a large amount of forces, the United Nations may stretch its mandate past the point of being an impartial actor. This paper argues the capacity of peacekeepers is a qualitative measure of their ability to fulfill their given mandate. The mandate of any United Nations peacekeeping force must match both the UN's peacekeeping principles as well as the capacity of the troops in the force. This paper will briefly describe the evolution of peacekeeping missions from their beginnings in 1950 to present day. It will then explain the concept of human security and the United States Institute of Peace's framework for creating a safe and secure environment, which protects civilians in conflict. Next, it recounts the operations and tactics from December 2014 to April 2015 of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to create a safe and secure environment and also gives a sense of how these operations may change over the next two months. The paper then identifies operational and tactical challenges to MINUSMA's peacekeeping operation. These challenges demonstrate MINUSMA suffers from a lack in military capacity, which can not necessarily be remedied by increasing the number of forces within MINUSMA. Finally, the paper recommends steps for MINSUMA to match its mandate with both UN peacekeeping principles and the mission's capacity.
Introduction
How do United Nations peacekeeping operations protect civilians in civil war? Once again, a United Nations-mandated force is being challenged to protect civilians in the midst of civil conflict, this time in Mali. Lisa Hultman has become a leading expert in the field by examining the topic from both the causes of violence against civilians and also the effectiveness of solutions. She argues peacekeeping interventions actually induce factions to target civilians for three reasons. First, factions want to establish territorial control prior to the inevitable peace settlement the invention will impose. Second, factions resort to targeting civilians when peace operations prevent them from attacking the other factions. Third, factions target civilians to reintroduce an environment of instability more suitable for their illicit economies. 1 Hultman,
Kathman and Shannon argue peacekeeping missions can be successful at protecting civilians when the mission includes troops and police in large numbers because it increases the mission's capacity. 2 The 2013 study charts as independent variables the quantity of peacekeepers, police and observers and correlates the number of civilian deaths as a dependent variable. The data set covers civil wars from 1991 to 2008. In a follow-on article, Hultman et al again examine peacekeeping success in terms of capacity and composition. 3 Hultman remarkably analyzes the effects of troop strength and organization on violence against civilians across nearly a twenty year span, yet she oversimplifies peacekeeper capacity to just a matter of troop strength. In doing so, Hultman appears to take as an inconsequential given the capabilities peacekeepers provide in terms of their operations and tactics. Such shorthand is not limited to academics. General Romeo Dallaire, Force Commander during Rwanda's ill-fated peacekeeping mission lamented "If I had a brigade, which is 5,000, I could have done a lot." 4 By so often measuring peacekeeping missions in terms of troop strength rather than their operational and tactical capability to protect civilians, peacekeeping studies have left a void in understanding the emerging challenges facing third generation peace operations. Furthermore, these studies may lead the United Nations to deploy peacekeeping missions which lack tactical and operational capabilities, even though the mission's troop strength appears adequate based on parametric studies. Likewise, receiving a large amount of forces, the United Nations may stretch its mandate past the point of being an impartial actor. This paper argues the capacity of peacekeepers is a qualitative measure of their ability to fulfill their given mandate. The mandate of any United Nations peacekeeping force must match both the UN's peacekeeping principles as well as the capacity of the troops in the force.
This paper will briefly describe the evolution of peacekeeping missions from their beginnings in 1950 to present day. It will then explain the concept of human security and the United States Institute of Peace's framework for creating a safe and secure environment, which protects civilians in conflict. Next, it recounts the operations and tactics from December 2014 to April 2015 of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to create a safe and secure environment and also gives a sense of how these operations may change over the next two months. The paper then identifies operational and tactical challenges to MINUSMA's peacekeeping operation. These challenges demonstrate MINUSMA suffers from a lack in military capacity, which can not necessarily be remedied by increasing the number of forces within MINUSMA. Finally, the paper recommends steps for MINSUMA to match its mandate with both UN peacekeeping principles and the mission's capacity.
United Nations peacekeeping operations trace their origins back to the spirit of the United The UN maintains international peace and security by relying on states to find a peaceful settlement to their disputes using negotiation, mediation, and the international courts. 6 Should these options fail, the UN has granted the Security Council special powers to "recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment" to resolve conflicts. 7 To deter and subsequently respond to "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression," 8 the Security Council may "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." 9 Early on, UN leadership realized such a binary view of conflict failed to take advantage of an opportunity to turn a short-term cessation of violence into a long-lasting peace agreement. The report recognized the need for peacebuilding within the UN mission. Peacekeepers were responsible for maintaining a safe and secure environment for the civilian population.
Peacebuilders first worked for a cessation to organized violence and second to make that environment self-sustaining by creating legitimate and lasting government institutions to provide basic essential services, the rule of law, and a stable economy. 25 Peacekeeping and peacebuilding became linked due to the inseparable nature of their work. After all, peacekeeping operations could not end until peacebuilding operations had successfully worked with the government to create self-sustaining institutions capable of preserving peace. The UN recognized peacekeeping operations within intrastate conflicts had become nation-building (or rather state-building) and began calling these new sets of missions "peace operations".
Peace operations challenged the original principles of peacekeeping operations set in the 1950s. As already mentioned, peace operations deploy before the cessation of violence by the parties to the conflict. Consequently, third generation peacekeepers have a significantly higher force protection burden. Additionally, peace operations require more troops to protect population centers throughout the country. Debate is ongoing on the principles of self-defense and impartiality within intrastate conflict. The Brahimi report recognizes this tension, arguing impartiality and self-defense are still bedrocks of peace operations. However, the report also concludes, "no failure did more to damage the standing and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor." 26 Operationally, this requires UN peacekeepers to identify threats to themselves and the civilian population. Moreover, it requires them to seize the initiative to counter those threats, with force if required. Practically speaking, peace operations must delineate between an active defensive strategy and taking the offensive against an aggressor. The recognition that peace operations must identify and prepare for threats forced the Brahimi report to restate impartiality in terms of strictly obeying the mandate and creating robust rules of engagement. 27 This new form of operations, impartial only to the mandate, altered the way the Security Council authorized the missions. Peace operations no longer used Chapter VI language from the UN Charter, giving the Security Council authority to recommend solutions to the crisis. 28 Instead, peace operations relied fully on Chapter VII, authorizing the use of force to restore peace.
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Human Security as a Framework for Peace Operations Human security is a multifaceted concept which seeks to address cross-cutting threats to survival, livelihood and human dignity. 30 Human security includes creating conditions which free the population from fear and want. 31 These are lofty goals, indeed. In multidimensional conflicts involving state actors, armed militias, terrorists, and organized crime, it allows peace operations to create holistic solutions aimed at the root causes of violence. Moreover, it directs efforts from the bottom-up perspective of bettering the lives of the population rather than topdown perspective of power between groups. Such holistic approaches also have a better chance of ensuring a lasting peace because they address the causal grievances underlying the violence.
The primary actor responsible for human security is the government. Peace operations therefore become mechanisms to develop state institutions. Such a task is not easy. Peace operations have limited resources. What's more is the government often lacks the will to develop institutions because it clashes with deep seated corruption and impunity by its own officials. Additionally, peace operations must be cautious not to build government institutions beyond the government's capacity to sustain them. Lastly, such a vast set of objectives has the potential to lose its focus if not directed by some method.
In fact as human security grew as a concept, the method by which peace operations could leverage human security to produce a lasting peace required more study and improvement.
Peace operations needed a framework to link seemingly disparate yet concurrent efforts such as digging wells, providing vaccines, securing marketplaces, and creating efficient courts back to a Governance, Social Well-Being, and the Rule of Law. Across these end-states are several guiding principles; first among them is host nation ownership and capacity. 32 United Nations peacekeepers apply this same framework to peace operations in intrastate conflicts.
A safe and secure environment allows civilians to live without fear of systematic violence. 33 The first condition is the cessation of large-scale violence where warring parties have agreed to a ceasefire. 34 Peacekeepers support the conditions of a ceasefire or peace agreement by keeping the factions separate and establishing distinct areas of control between them. In intrastate conflicts, there are likely more than two factions. Mixed in with separatists groups and government proxy militias, terrorists and illicit traffickers can become spoilers. Even more daunting for peacekeepers is that any individual can take on more than one identity with connections to several factions, making motivations difficult to decipher.
The second condition is that a legitimate state must establish its monopoly over the means of violence. Peacekeepers in intrastate conflicts assist by advising on security sector reform (SSR) and the disarmament and demobilization of non-government factions. 35 Peacekeepers link these two efforts because armed groups are reluctant to voluntarily disarm when the fear the army and police will seek reprisals. Peacekeepers council and train government forces on the rule of law and community relationships. As they are helping to reform state security institutions, peacekeepers will enforce the details of the peace agreement on disarmament and demobilization. Peacekeepers can collect and destroy weapons, dismantle illegitimate militias, all the while providing security guarantees for the affected groups.
Peacekeeping units can also partner with all parties to the conflict in an effort to reintegrate segments back into society.
The third condition is physical security, where the population does not fear the outbreak of violence and the government can protect civil infrastructure. This condition allows refugees to return home without fear of retribution. 36 Peacekeepers protect vulnerable populations regardless of which faction the population supports. This idea goes to the core of peace operations' principle of impartiality and underscores the belief that people can only achieve peace through security. Peacekeepers also protect, and at times escort, non-governmental organizations (NGO) providing humanitarian assistance. Without security, NGOs cannot transport and distribute humanitarian aid such as food, water and medical care. Consequently, the lack of these basic human services undermines the physical security of the population.
Infrastructure is also essential to distributing basic human services. Peacekeepers defend roads, ports, markets, wells, and power distribution systems. Recently the improvised explosive device (IED) has become particularly deadly for local populations, peacekeepers and NGOs.
Peacekeepers educate the police and population alike to identify and react to IEDs. They also train the military and law enforcement officials how to disarm and dispose of these weapons.
The fourth condition is territorial security where the government controls its borders and there is free and open movement throughout the country. 37 Porous borders invite new factions such as organized crime into an already unstable condition. Additionally, unprotected borders allow weapons within a conflict to grow in number and lethality. Peacekeepers secure border crossings, air and sea ports and train border guards to perform this mission. To support freedom of movement, peacekeepers work with the military and law enforcement to control roads and waterways. Additionally, they must restrict the flow of illicit commodities such as drugs, weapons, and people.
The fifth condition is public order where the government enforces laws equitably to protect life, liberty and property. Additionally, the government prevents and prosecutes criminal and politically-motivated violence. 38 Peacekeepers support public order by providing the conditions for security outlined above, training the host nation to provide these conditions on its own, and assisting the government to grow legitimate judicial institutions. MUJAO and talks of its direct links to the government of Mali are a sensitive subject. 43 Rather, it is more accurate to state that MUJAO has made partnerships with some government officials to facilitate its trafficking business. 44 Regardless of how widespread links between the Government of Mali, GATIA and MUJAO are, these groups have interests in keeping these relationships to facilitate business and are therefore against efforts by the Coordination which jeopardize them.
Proximate Causes and Recent Events
In January 2012, the MNLA reinforced with AQIM members attacked and defeated the In June, the terrorist group MUJAO turned on and defeated the separatist group MNLA in Gao, sending MNLA forces fleeing north to their stronghold in Kidal. As MUJAO advanced south toward Bamako in September, the Malian government requested international assistance. MINUSMA also protects civilians by facilitating the resolution of intercommunal conflict, which could lead to violence. In the Timbuktu region, peacekeepers maintain dialogues with nine armed groups as well as the Malian army to prevent the escalation of violence.
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MINUSMA is clear about its intention to resolve conflict there and urges groups to settle disagreements before they become emotionally charged events. Peacekeepers in the Mopti region similarly assist with conflict resolution between the Dogons and Peuls and Tauregs and Peuls over land. 60 In the Gao region, peacekeepers lead observation and verification patrols with representatives from armed groups and the Malian army which investigate human rights violations. 61 Having representatives from all sides demonstrates MINUSMA treats violations of human rights seriously without prejudice to which party perpetrated the act. Additionally, these patrols and the resulting reports provide an official truth and narrative of human rights violations that dissuades each side from inflating numbers and exacerbating conflict. In each of these interfaces, MINUSMA uses its relationship to remind all parties of their commitment to the ceasefire they signed as part of the Ouagadougou Accords as well as each group's responsibility to protect civilians. 62 Peacekeeping missions are not intended to be long-term. To create a lasting secure environment, MINUSMA is building capacity within the Malian state to protect civilians. Such institution-building is usually rolled up into a broader security sector reform, but waiting for a top-down solution has its limitations. MINUSMA is working at the regional level to build capable civil administration. In the Timbuktu region, peacekeepers conduct training workshops with the police and military forces that teach tactics, techniques and procedures to protect the population. 63 In the regions of Gao and Mopti, peacekeepers conduct joint training patrols with national police, gendarmerie and the national guard. 64 These efforts are at an early stage and therefore MINUSMA's implementation is sporadic and uneven, but it is a start.
Challenges
MINUSMA faces three challenges to its peacekeeping mission. First, the on-going counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism environment in the Gao and Kidal regions adds a new complexity to peace operations. MINUSMA lacks both a peace to keep and a permissive environment in which to operate. Terrorists continue to target peacekeepers and aid workers forcing the mission to prioritize force protection over other activities. According to the Head of MINUSMA's Regional Bureau in Gao, the region is "not a permissive environment for peacekeeping as we know it" and the situation continues to degrade. 65 Recommendations MINSUMA's mission, which implies a counter-insurgency role while operating in a counter-terrorism environment, is an overreach of its capacity. Furthermore, properly executing a counter-insurgency strategy requires offensive operations which undermine the United Nations' impartiality. MINUSMA soldiers are not trained and equipped for the counterinsurgency mission and the troops lack the appetite to fight in this manner. More importantly, the United Nations must remain an impartial international organization especially during peace operations because the organization also is charged with upholding international law, delivering humanitarian aid and protecting human rights. Donald provides a good definition of impartiality.
"An impartial entity is active, its actions independent of the parties to a conflict, based on a judgment of the situation; it is fair and just in its treatment of the parties while not taking sides." 83 In many cases including Mali the United Nations helps broker the peace agreement between the parties. By attempting to implement a counter-insurgency strategy, MINUSMA has become a party to the conflict leaving a void in honest brokers. Rather than transporting and guarding humanitarian aid and protecting civilians, MINUSMA has become the target.
MINUSMA should refocus its mission to the protection of civilians by providing physical security for populations and ensuring public order. MINUSMA had a perfect opportunity to demonstrate their ability to impartially protect civilians on 27 April 2015 in the town of Menaka. Providing law enforcement during such a chaotic time would protect civilians and create a semblance of stability within towns like Menaka.
MINUSMA should also continue its involvement in facilitating access and delivery of basic needs and services such as food, water and shelter. In times of crisis people may use that crisis as an excuse to deny access to basic services based on group affiliation. MINUSMA should ensure wells do not become sources of conflict. Additionally, the mission can patrol the roads to ensure a safe environment for humanitarian assistance to flow into conflict areas. Here, UNMAS' mine-clearing operations can be portrayed in an impartial manner. MINUSMA can also work with non-government organizations to ensure water and food sources are safe and to prevent the spread of disease. 87 Recommending MINUSMA shift focus to more impartial activities does not deny the terrorist threat in the region, nor the insurgency. The French Operation Barkane is a regional counter-terrorism mission. Perhaps the French could increase this operation, or other western states could contribute forces to the operation. Regardless, MINUSMA forces and Barkane forces should not be co-located as they are in some areas in Mali. Doing so leads to the perception of MINUSMA supporting French interests in Mali, which are complex to say the least. MINUSMA then becomes an easy target for those opposed to the French, not just the terrorists.
It is the role of the Malian government to fight the insurgency. Counter-insurgency doctrine argues the center of gravity for such operations is the population. In short, the Government of Mali must instill a sense of its own legitimacy within the people in Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu. To do so, the government must be capable of providing security, governance, rule of law, a stable economy and social well-being of its citizens. MINUSMA's efforts to provide human security, stabilize Mali's economy and enhance social well-being of the Malian people does assist in stabilizing the country, but MINUSMA provides these services impartially.
Rather than supporting the government as a hoped-for short-cut to the cessation of violence,
MINUSMA should work with all parties to the conflict to protect civilians and urge all parties to consider a political resolution to the conflict. focus on the required capabilities to protect civilians in these environments and zero in on which TCCs can be trained to provide those capabilities.
Conclusion

